We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions. JEL Classifications: C62, C72, D72, D74
Introduction
Contests are a type of games in which players expend costly efforts (resources) in order to win prize(s). The effort expenditures by players determine their respective probabilities of winning a prize. The function that maps efforts into probabilities of winning is called a contest success function (CSF). One of the most frequently used CSFs in the contest literature is a lottery CSF of Tullock (1980) ; in which the probability of winning equals the ratio of a player's effort to the sum of all players' efforts. 1 In this paper we consider a Tullock-type contest in which players' outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. Under this structure we find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in this contest. We show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify several contests in which multiple equilibria may arise under very general conditions. The existing literature documents that asymmetry in prize valuation (Nti, 1999) , cost structure (Paul and Wilhite, 1990) , and effectiveness in influencing the CSF (Gradstein, 1995) can result in asymmetric equilibrium. In this paper, however, we show that even under symmetric set up one may obtain asymmetric equilibria in Tullock-type contests. Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) prove the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium for a simple Tullock contest. Cornes and Hartley (2005) extend the analysis and argue that multiple equilibria may exist in contests with increasing returns CSFs. Yamazaki (2008) reaffirms this result for contests in which players are asymmetric in terms of value, effectiveness and budget constraints. In this paper we show that the uniqueness of equilibrium 1 Tullock's lottery CSF is widely employed because a number of studies have provided axiomatic justification for it (Skaperdas 1996; Clark and Riis 1998) . Also, Baye and Hoppe (2003) identified conditions under which a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games are equivalent to the Tullock contest.
crucially depends on the specification of the cost and spillover parameters in the payoff function.
Under very general restrictions, even under a standard lottery CSF multiple equilibria may exist in symmetric Tullock contests.
The finding that multiple equilibria may arise in simple Tullock-type contests is important for a number of reasons. First, in multi-stage or repeated games the existence of multiple non-payoff equivalent equilibria means that one can condition equilibrium selection in the subgame based on past behavior. This allows for a wide range of payoffs to be supported as subgame perfect equilibria. Second, in the presence of multiple equilibria, comparative statics have to be conditioned on a particular equilibrium since different equilibria may lead to different comparative statics results. Finally, the existence of multiple equilibria is important for designing both static and dynamic contests. A contest designer needs to account for the full profile of equilibria and corresponding comparative statics in order to achieve a given objective.
Contest Model and Equilibria
We consider a Tullock-type contest involving two risk-neutral players and two prizes.
The players, denoted by ݅ and ݆, value the winning prize as ܹ 0 and the losing prize as ‫ܮ‬ ‫א‬ Թ, with ܹ ‫ܮ‬ . Players simultaneously expend efforts ‫ݔ‬ 0 and ‫ݔ‬ 0 . The probability that player ݅ is the winner is decided by a lottery CSF:
The outcome contingent payoff for player ݅ is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival:
where ߙ ଵ , ߙ ଶ are cost and ߚ ଵ , ߚ ଶ are spillover parameters with restrictions ߙ ଵ ൏ 0 and ߙ ଶ 0.
Define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γሺ݅, ݆, Ωሻ, where
is a set of parameters. Under complete information the expected payoff for player ݅ is:
where ሺ‫ݔ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ ് ሺ0,0ሻ. For ‫ݔ‬ ൌ ‫ݔ‬ ൌ 0, the expected payoff is ‫ܧ‬൫ߨ ሺ‫ݔ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ൯ ൌ ሺܹ ‫ܮ‬ሻ/2.
By taking first order condition in (3), player ݅'s best response function (BRF) is
if ‫ݔ‬ ሺܹ െ ‫ܮ‬ሻ/ሺെߙ ଶ െ ߚ ଵ ߚ ଶ ሻ, and otherwise, ‫ݔ‬ ோி ൌ 0 . And the corresponding unique symmetric equilibrium is:
The slope of the BRF is derived as:
It is clear that the slope, as well as, the curvature of the BRF is different for different values of the cost and spillover parameters. The BRF is a parabola, and if the curvatures of the two BRFs are large enough, then the two parabolas may intersect in multiple points, generating multiple equilibria. Therefore, in addition to the symmetric equilibrium (5), the contest Γሺ݅, ݆, Ωሻ can 
Examples of Multiple Equilibria
Next we consider several contests in which multiple equilibria may exist. In the 'lazy winner' contest of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2010) the winner faces lower marginal cost than the loser, i.e. Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, ߙ ଵ , ߙ ଶ , 0,0ሽሻ with |ߙ ଵ | ൏ |ߙ ଶ |. The payoff function for player ݅ is:
ߨ ሺ‫ݔ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ ൌ ቊ ܹ ߙ ଵ ‫ݔ‬ with probability ‫‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ ߙ ଶ ‫ݔ‬ with probability 1 െ ‫‬ ሺ‫ݔ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ
Under symmetric equilibrium, according to the proposition, both players expend equal efforts ‫ݔ‬ Multiple equilibria can also arise in contests with spillovers (Chung, 1996; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2010) . Consider, for example, a general 'input spillover' contest, where the effort spillover gain of the loser is sufficiently higher than the spillover gain of the winner, we arrive at the case of multiple equilibria. In particular, any combination of ߚ ଵ and ߚ ଶ , such that ߚ ଵ െ ߚ ଶ ൏ െ4, will generate one symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria. In any asymmetric equilibrium, one player expends very high effort, increasing the chance of winning, while the other player expends very low effort, ensuring a significant spillover benefit from losing. This scenario resembles R&D contests in countries where property rights are not protected by the government and the spillover in case of losing is very high. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to free ride on the effort of the others. One can apply our analysis to show that multiple equilibria can also arise in contests of Amegashie (1999) , Glazer and Konrad (1999) , and Matros and Armanios (2009) . For example, Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼሺ1 െ ‫,ݓ‪ሻ‬ݐ‬ 0, െሺ1 െ ‫ݐ‬ሻ, െ1,0,0ሽሻ in which the non-negative profit of a rent-seeker is taxed by a tax rate ‫ݐ‬ ‫א‬ ሺ0,1ሻ. It is easy to show that when the tax rate is excessively high (i.e. more than 80%) then, besides the symmetric equilibrium, multiple equilibria exist. In the endogenous prize value contest by Amegashie (1999) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a two-player Tullock contest under complete information and find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in this setting. We show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify several contests in which multiple equilibria may arise under very general conditions.
The findings of this paper can be applied to areas of contest design, R&D spillovers, litigations and repeated games, where multiple equilibria may arise. One can also extend the analysis in the current study in terms of incomplete information, the number of players, risk aversion, and nonlinear CSFs. We leave these questions for future research.
5 Following the same procedure, one can derive multiple equilibria in Cohen and Sela (2005) , where only the winner is reimbursed. This has been independently shown by Matros (2009) .
